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d’opérationsȱ d’openȱ marketȱ estȱ typiquementȱ décroissanteȱ pourȱ lesȱ contreparties.ȱ Surȱ cetteȱ base,ȱ nousȱ



















































































































incorrectȱ descriptionȱ ofȱ theȱ incentivesȱ thatȱ underlieȱ centralȱ bankȱ operations.ȱ Inȱ aȱ liquidityȬprovidingȱ
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analysedȱ byȱ Klempererȱ andȱ Meyerȱ [35].ȱ Ourȱ theoreticalȱ analysisȱ extendsȱ theirȱ modelȱ toȱ allowȱ forȱ theȱ
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heterogeneousȱpopulationȱofȱbanks.ȱForȱtheȱcaseȱofȱtheȱdiscriminatoryȱpricingȱrule,ȱtheȱmodelȱpredictsȱbidȱ

















In many modern currency areas, monetary policy is implemented by steering
short-term interest rates indirectly through the provision of more or less
liquidity to the banking system. Besides outright trading, one established
method of creating a ﬂow of liquidity between the central bank and the
market is to perform a tender or auction in which commercial banks ﬁrst
submit bids or bid schedules, and the central bank subsequently determines,
usually with a certain degree of discretion, the ﬂow of liquidity to be eected
to or from any commercial bank. E.g., in the euro area, the European Central
Bank (ECB) employs tender procedures in this way to auction o repurchase
agreements and collateralized loans with an average face value of more than
200 bn euro on a weekly basis. Understanding the incentives shaping bidding
behaviour in these auctions therefore appears to be of critical importance for
the eectiveness of monetary policy implementation.
From a theoretical perspective, open market operations are auctions of a
perfectly divisible good or auctions of shares (Wilson [55]).8 It has been
noted in the literature that these auctions are economically quite dierent
from single-unit auctions, so there has been a need for an independent study
of auctions of shares.9 One of the more prominent examples of a share
auction is constituted by the mechanisms used for the sale of treasury notes
(see Bikhchandani and Huang [8]). Similar to central bank operations, these
auctions take place in the anticipation of a secondary market in which bidders
may trade the good after the auction at a common market price. In line with
this institutional feature, the theoretical literature has traditionally assumed
constant marginal valuations for the good to be auctioned (see, e.g., Back
8Wilson proved that auctions of shares may be subject to severe collusion. A number
of papers have stressed the role of endogenous supply in avoiding collusion. See Hansen
[30], Back and Zender [3], Lengwiler [39], McAdams [43], and LiCalzi and Pavan [40]. As
shown by Kremer and Nyborg [36, 37], collusion can also be reduced by modifying the
standard rationing scheme.
9E.g., when bidders demand more than one unit in a multi-unit auction with uniform
pricing, then truthful bidding will typically be suboptimal. This ﬁnding stands in contrast
to the theoretical optimality of truthful bidding in the single-unit second price auction, of
which the auction with uniform pricing is a natural generalisation.
6and Zender [2]). However, as we will argue in this paper, the assumption
of constant marginal valuations may not be appropriate for studying central
bank operations.
As will be explained more carefully in Section II, open market operations
dier from treasury auctions in particular because of the need to handle
ﬁnancial risks associated with the funding transaction. Indeed, the necessity
for the respective lender to limit those risks establishes a close link between
the liquidity transferred to the borrower on the one hand and the speciﬁc
measures taken to manage the risk on the other. Ignoring this link may
lead to an inaccurate description of the incentives underlying participation
decisions and bidding behaviour in central bank operations.
For example, in a liquidity providing operation of the Eurosystem, the bor-
rowing counterparty has a substantial discretion concerning the assets that
are transferred to the central bank to cover the funding operation. This
discretion may matter if central bank and market participants have dier-
ent needs for controlling the risks associated with funding transactions. In
particular, while a less liquid asset may justify a higher interest rate in the
interbank market because the lending counterparty may be forced to liqui-
date the asset quickly, this type of consideration should be much less relevant
when the central bank is the lender. The dierent pricing of liquidity risk by
the private market and the central bank should imply a preference of bidders
for illiquid collateral to be used in central bank operations. Moreover, with
an increasing allotment in the central bank tender, the counterparty would
have to forward more liquid types of collateral, which makes the primary
market increasingly less attractive compared to the interbank market. This
consideration oers support for a set-up with declining marginal valuations
for liquidity-providing central bank operations. Consistent with this view, we
will assume throughout that marginal valuations in the auction are strictly
declining.10
10Another dierence lies in the objectives that are pursued with individual operations.
In the case of treasury auctions, the theoretical literature has emphasised the objective
of revenue maximisation besides, of course, allocational e!ciency. In central bank opera-
7Of course, we are not ﬁrst in making this assumption. Most notably, Klem-
perer and Meyer [35] consider a reverse auction in which proﬁt-maximising
oligopolists select supply functions in the presence of uncertainty about mar-
ket demand. Our discussion of auctions with uniform pricing11 in Section III
is closely related to their analysis, but allows for a heterogeneous population
of bidders. We also oer a more explicit treatment of the non-negativity
requirement for allotments. Section IV in our paper can be understood as an
adaptation of Klemperer and Meyer’s [35] model to the case of the discrimi-
natory pricing rule. Ausubel and Cramton [1] assume declining marginal val-
uations and show in particular that the incentives for dierential bid shading
cause an allocative ine!ciency in the uniform price auction. Our ﬁndings il-
lustrate their analysis by discussing speciﬁc equilibria with downward-sloping
demands in both the uniform-price and the discriminatory auction.
There is also a closely related literature that investigates simultaneous auc-
tions of a ﬁnite number of identical objects to a population of bidders with
multi-unit demand. Noussair [47] provides necessary and su!cient conditions
for bid functions to describe a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a uniform-price
auction oered to bidders with two-unit demand. It is shown that there is an
incentive to lower the bid placed on the second unit. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn [27, 28] characterise equilibra in uniform-price and discriminatory
tions, however, revenue maximisation plays a subordinate role. Objectives pursued with
individual central bank operations are in general less clear-cut but seem to entail quanti-
tative elements, the signalling of the monetary policy stance, and an equal treatment of
bidders.
11The scientiﬁc debate on auctions of shares and multi-unit auctions has focused mostly
on the two types of auctions, the uniform-price auction and the discriminatory auction.
These are auction formats that have been used both in treasury auctions and in central
bank operations. E.g., the Eurosystem has relied on variable rate tenders with discrimina-
tory pricing in its regular main reﬁnancing operations since June 2000. In both procedures,
each bidder may submit a demand schedule, and a cut-o price is determined by equating
demand and supply. Each bidder receives then an allotment corresponding to his or her
demand at the cut-o price, where a rationing rule is applied at the margin, if necessary.
The dierence between uniform and discriminatory auctions lies in the pricing rule. With
uniform pricing, each bidder pays the cut-o price, while with discriminatory pricing,
each bidder pays her own bid. Back and Zender [2] and Wang and Zender [54] establish a
revenue inequivalence between uniform and discriminatory auctions for constant marginal
valuations. See Maskin and Riley [42] for an analysis of optimal multi-unit auctions.
8auctions of two identical units. They also predict bid shading, and ﬁnd in ad-
dition that discriminatory pricing may imply the submission of identical bids
for both units, despite decreasing returns. In these papers, the stop-out price
under uniform pricing is assumed to be the highest losing bid. Draaisma and
Noussair [16] derive necessary conditions for a Bayesian equilibrium in a uni-
form price auction where the stop-out price is the lowest winning bid. More
general existence results for indivisible objects have recently been obtained
by Jackson and Swinkels [33] and McAdams [44].
We believe that the present paper may contribute to the theoretical literature
in two ways. First, we construct equilibria in the discriminatory share auction
to an arbitrary number of bidders with decreasing marginal valuations.12 To
obtain explicit results, we have chosen to consider as the simplest possible set-
up a speciﬁcation with linear marginal valuations, and uniformly distributed
uncertainty about supply. There is no principal di!culty in extending the
present model to non-linear demand functions. As it turns out, the linear set-
up leads to piecewise linear bid schedules also in the discriminatory tender
so that the bidding behaviour in the two tender formats can be studied and
compared in a very explicit way.13
The second contribution of this paper is the result that for large populations
of bidders, bid shading may be present in discriminatory auctions (but not
12Characterisation of bidding behaviour in the primary market that, while dierent in
interpretation, are structurally similar to our results have recently been given by Biais,
Martimort, and Rochet [6] in the context of adverse selection and by Viswanathan and
Wang [53] in the context of risk aversion. Our analysis goes beyond these contributions
by considering explicitly the possibility of trade between the bidders after the auction.
13It has been acknowledged in the literature that there has been a lack of speciﬁc set-ups
of auctions of shares with decreasing marginal valuations that are fully tractable on the
one hand and rich enough on the other to be empirically testable, at least in principle.
The reason for this deﬁciency may be that, in an auction of shares, each bidder selects a
whole demand function in a strategic way. The su!ciency conditions in the calculus of
variations, however, may be non-trivial to check, so that most existing models, especially
those allowing for incomplete information about demand, have been solved employing
a“ ﬁrst-order approach.” Hortaçsu [32] derives an explicit solution of a share auction
with discriminatory pricing for two bidders and an exponential distribution of types. He
remarks, however, that the Euler condition employed is only necessary. Chakraborty [15]
oers su!cient conditions for a Bayesian equilibrium in a discriminatory auction of two
identical units.
9in uniform price auctions). Indeed, as will become clear, as long as aggregate
uncertainty about the allotment of the central bank exists, a bidder in the
discriminatory auction has an incentive to shade her complete bid schedule.
We discuss this point and show that the conclusion is consistent with the
evidence for the euro area.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we argue that
bidders in central bank reﬁnancing operations should typically have declining
valuation functions. Section III derives the equilibrium of the variable rate
tender for the case of the uniform pricing rule. Section IV treats the case of
the discriminatory pricing rule. Section V concludes. The Appendix contains
technical proofs.
I I .D e m a n di nr e ﬁnancing operations
As described in the Introduction, open market operations (or simply central
bank operations) are used by central banks in particular in order to create
a ﬂow of liquidity between the central bank and the banking system. E.g.,
if autonomous liquidity factors such as banknotes cause a ﬂow of liquidity
from the banking system into the non-bank sector, then a central bank may
decide to compensate the liquidity outﬂow by injecting additional money
into the banking system. In this section, we argue that marginal valuations
of bidders in liquidity-providing central bank operations should typically be
strictly decreasing.
A model of dual funding. Our hypothesis of declining marginal valuations
(or simply declining returns) for central bank operations can be obtained from
the following model of dual funding.14 Consider a single commercial bank
seeking a given amount t of funding. There are two independent sources of
funds, called for simplicity primary and secondary market, with market rates
uS and uV, respectively. Both markets are perfect, with two qualiﬁcations.
14The current framework may also help to shed light on the likely consequences of having
a single list of eligible collateral (cf. ECB [21]), and on the recent discussion (cf. ECB
[26]) regarding counterparties’ incentives to use collateral of a given type (in particular,
lower-rated government debt).
10The ﬁrst qualiﬁcation is that the access to the primary market is one-sided
only, i.e., there is no possibility to deposit liquidity in the primary market.
The second qualiﬁcation is the existence of a premium on interest rates that
needs to be paid for the participation in the two markets. This point will be
made more precise below.15
In the institutional realities of the money market, demand t will roughly
correspond to a sum of the bank’s requirements on reserve holdings and
precautionary demand resulting from idiosyncratic liquidity needs (cf. in
particular Poole [48] and Baltensperger [4]). The primary market corresponds
roughly to central bank supply of interbank liquidity. Indeed, since we are
proposing the model of dual funding as a means to determine the bank’s
marginal valuation, or equivalently, the bank’s demand at a given price,
the format of the tender procedure applied in the primary market does not
enter the consideration at this stage. Details on the procedures used for the
handling of collateral in the context of lending from the Eurosystem can be
found in ECB [20, 23, 25]. The secondary market is a shortcut for the euro
money market including all forms of unsecured and secured interbank lending
including the exploitation of hedging possibilities provided by the market for
derivatives in short-term interest rates.
Our modelling of the funding activities is motivated by the fact that the
transfer of liquidity from one counterparty to another involves either the
reverse transfer of collateral or the taking of credit risk by one lender. To
avoid case distinctions in the formal discussion, we will interpret unsecured
lending as the usage of a credit line that is collateralized with an intangible
“asset” tantamount to the conﬁdence of the other counterparty in the bank’s
repayment of the debt. For simplicity, we refer to these types of assets as
conﬁdence assets. Following this convention, all lending both in the primary
and in the secondary markets takes place against some collateral. We may
15Our assumption of a perfect secondary market reﬂects the general perception that the
euro money market is very e!cient (see, e.g., Hartmann, Manna, and Manzaranes [31]).
That is to say that premia on the individual transactions are caused mainly by the need
to price in the ﬁnancial risk associated with the transaction, and less by the remaining
market imperfections.
11therefore change the perspective and put the collateral in the focus of our
consideration.
Let D denote the range of all asset types available for the bank, including
the conﬁdence assets. The bank’s balance sheet will be represented by a
measure with density {(d)  0 (cf. Billingsley [9], p. 213). We assume that
t h eb a n k ’ sc o l l a t e r a li ss u !cient to cover the necessary funding. As haircuts
are not considered in the basic set-up, this is tantamount to the constraint
Z
D
{(d)gd  t.( 1 )
Indeed, if this condition was violated, the bank could not ﬁnd the necessary
funding, and would be considered to be at least illiquid.16
Eligibility. Primary and secondary markets may die ri nt h et y p eo ft r a n s -
actions that are accepted by the other counterparty, be it the respective
national central bank or some market participant. Our argument is valid in
particular in a scenario where central bank and market participants accept
the same range of funding operations. To capture the realities of the market
place, however, we will be somewhat more general in the sequel. E.g., all
provision of liquidity by the Eurosystem has to be protected by collateral
(cf. ECB [23]), which restricts transactions involving unsecured lending to
the secondary market. The Eurosystem does also not take part in tri-party
repos, i.e. repurchase agreements in which a private agent exchanges cash
or collateral for at least one of the counterparties. On the other hand, the
interbank market typically does not accept highly illiquid assets (such as
bank loans) as collateral, which restricts this type of funding transaction to
the primary market. Certain types of transactions are feasible both in the
primary and in the secondary market. A simple example for the euro area
may be a repurchase agreement over a one week maturity secured by a euro
area government bond.17
16The integral representation is used for the convenience of the reader. When the number
of asset types is ﬁnite, then (1) becomes a sum over all positions of the bank’s balance
sheet, and marginal valuations will be weakly declining staircase functions.
17The list of collateral eligible for transactions with the Eurosystem is maintained by
the ECB, and can be downloaded from its website http://www.ecb.int.
12To make the above-described distinction between asset types explicit in the
model, we assume that there are three mutually disjoint categories of collat-
eral
D = S ^ V ^ SV,
where, as usual, ^ denotes the set-theoretic union operator. Category S
collateral is accepted by the primary market only. Category V collateral is
accepted by the secondary market only. Category SV collateral can be used
in both markets. Above, we have provided examples that show that all three
sets S, V,a n dSV should be nonempty in the case of the Eurosystem. To
further illustrate the meaning of these categories, we recall that in the course
of the establishment of a single list in the euro area, equities have been taken
from the list of eligible collateral, while foreign debt instruments have been
allowed as eligible collateral (see Bayle [5] and ECB [21, 22]). In the present
framework, this would mean to shift the set of asset types Dh corresponding
to equities from VS to V, and to shift the set of asset types Di corresponding
to foreign debt instruments from V to VS.
Premia on market prices. T h eb a s i cb e n c h m a r kr a t ei nt h es e c u r e dm a r -
ket is without doubt the repo rate against highly liquid interest rate instru-
ments standardised in the market under the heading general collateral (GC).
To ﬁx ideas, we will refer to this rate as the “risk-free” rate. Given this
benchmark, a convenient way to specify an interest rate level for an indi-
vidual transaction is to add premia that reﬂect the dierence between the
benchmark rate and actual costs of funding.18
On the risk-free rate a risk premium is added for any risk that the lender
must take. The premium may have various motivations. Most obviously, in
the case of an unsecured transaction, the premium on the risk-free rate is the
risk cost which is an interest rate margin that reimburses the lender for the
expected loss caused by the credit risk inherent to the transaction.19 But also
18When the funding aspect of a repurchase transaction becomes dominated by the de-
mand for a speciﬁc security, then repo rates on such “specials” drop below the GC rate.
See Du!e [18] and Jordan and Jordan [34].
19For an analytical model capturing this consideration, see Bierman and Hass [7] or
Yawitz [56].
13the conditions on secured transactions (e.g. a repurchase agreement) may
dier signiﬁcantly. One main factor aecting prices for secured transactions
is the liquidity of the collateral oered by the borrower. Indeed, while the
market value of the collateral will typically somewhat exceed the value of
the transaction, and additional risk control measures such as margining may
be in place, the acceptance of less liquid assets as collateral may mean a
liquidity risk for the lender. That is to say, if the borrower defaults and the
lender is forced, for whatever reason, to liquidate the collateral quickly, then
the liquidation value may be substantially lower than the market value that
could be realised with more time. This speciﬁcr i s kj u s t i ﬁes a higher interest
rate spread on the loan that is collateralized with a less liquid asset.20
The logic of the risk premium is consistent with market experience. For in-
stance, Santillán, Bayle, and Thygesen [49] report that market participants
contacted in the context of market surveys tended to distinguish collateral
along a dimension that could be termed “expensiveness.” According to this
study, one of the most frequently mentioned reasons for the heterogeneity
has been the liquidity of the assets. Välimäki [52] studies bidding in cen-
tral bank operations under the assumption of constant returns. However,
he acknowledges the strength of the assumption (see p. 35 in his thesis):
“For simplicity, we abstract from the fact that the interest rates of dierent
instruments carry dierent premia over the risk-free yield curve.” Our view
is also consistent with the observation that the US Federal Reserve System
conducts tenders in parallel for three types of collateral: Treasury, Agencies,
and Mortgage Backed. The spread between the most liquid collateral and
the least liquid collateral can be as high as 6-7 basis points.
In addition to the interest rate payment, i.e., the sum of risk-free rate and
the risk premium, the borrower may still have transaction costs,a tl e a s ti n
a secured operation. The necessity to deliver the collateral can be costly, for
instance, when the collateral is held in one country and needs to be delivered
20More generally, the risk of having to resolve a position in an illiquid market will depress
the current valuation of that position. For a formal treatment, see the intriguing analysis
of Diamond and Verrechia [17].
14in another country of the euro area. While both the Eurosystem and the
market have developed solutions for this type of international transaction
(see ECB [25]), the fees and eorts necessary to accomplish the transaction
may be still non-negligible at present, as reﬂe c t e di nt h eo n g o i n gd i s c u s s i o n
about harmonisation of the landscape for securities clearing and settlement
in the euro area. In addition to the costs of transferring collateral, there may
be administrative costs of handling the assets (e.g., because of income ﬂows,
ownership reporting, voting rights, etc).
Finally, there may be opportunity costs for the borrower associated with the
use of collateral for funding purposes. By deﬁnition, opportunity costs do
not dier between primary and secondary markets, so they do not inﬂuence
the decision between funding markets, conditional on the usage of the collat-
eral for funding purposes. For instance, if the collateral pool of the bank is
small, then the collateral used in a funding operation is no longer available
for securing other transactions. Moreover, potential fees obtainable for se-
curities lending cannot be realised. There may also be changes in the usage
of risk capital and in regulatory charges, which can be understood as fac-
tors increasing or decreasing the costs associated with an individual funding
transaction.
Optimal funding. According to this simple terminology, the total funding
costs are a sum of the risk free rate, premia for credit and liquidity risks, the
transaction costs, and the opportunity costs of collateral. In the model, we
have to abstract from the dierent dimensions that may determine the costs
of an individual funding operation. To each collateral/asset d, we therefore
assume given data on average premia (expressed in basis points) for eligible
uses in the respective markets. This provides a transaction-speciﬁcp r e m i u m
wS(d)  0 for collateral d 5 S ^ SV and similarly a premium wV(d)  0 for
collateral d 5 V ^ SV.T h e e ective cost of an individual funding transac-
tion for the counterparty is the sum of the prevailing interest rate and the
transaction-speciﬁcp r e m i u m .
The bank’s funding policy ({S>{ V) determines the amounts {S(d) and {V(d)
15of collateral of each asset type d to be used in primary and secondary market
funding. Several restrictions need to be satisﬁed. The ﬁrst restriction says
that the bank obtains the necessary funding in the ﬁrst place. This condition





V(d)}gd  t.( 2 )
Another natural restriction on the funding policy is given by the bank’s
balance sheet. Both borrowing or lending of collateral is not considered in




V(d)  {(d),( 3 )
i.e., the total collateral of a given asset type used in the primary and sec-
ondary market must not exceed the total available in the bank’s balance
sheet. The reader will note that the consistency of conditions (2) and (3) is
ensured by our assumption (1) that the bank is not illiquid. Similarly to (3),
we also need to impose
{
S(d)  0 (4)
{
V(d)  0 (5)
for all assets d 5 D.T h eﬁnal restriction incorporates collateral requirements
and eligibility criteria expressed by the partition of D into the sets S, V,a n d
SV:
{
S(d)=0for d 5 V,a n d{
V(d)=0for d 5 S.( 6 )
For simplicity, the basic model excludes the possibility of intermediation, i.e.,
on-lending of reserves in the secondary market.21 T h ep r o b l e mo ft h eb a n k
can then be formulated as follows. The task is to determine the least costly
funding policy that guarantees a funding of at least t,a n dw h i c hd o e s ,f o r












s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6).
21See, however, Neyer and Wiemers [46] for a model of intermediation with SV = B.
16We impose that the bank’s balance sheet contains a su!ciently broad range
of assets with a heterogeneous cost structure.22 Under this condition, the
solution to the linear programme (7) has a very natural structure. There are
three cases, depending on the relative levels of primary and secondary market
rates, and on the structure of the bank’s balance sheet. We consider only
the most interesting case, the internal solution, in which market rates dier
by not too much between markets and the bank is active in both primary
and secondary markets. See Figure 1 for illustration. In this case, there will
be critical values of premia wS
W and wV









such that a category S collateral d is used for funding purposes (i.e., {S(d)=
{(d) and {V(d)=0 ) if and only if wS(d)  wS
W ,ac a t e g o r yV collateral d is
used for funding purposes (i.e., {V(d)={(d) and {S(d)=0 )i fa n do n l yi f
wV(d)  wV
W. Moreover, a category SV collateral d is used for funding in the









Analogously, a category SV collateral d is used for funding in the secondary








S(d).( 1 0 )
The critical values are determined implicitly by the condition that the nomi-
nal value of the collateral used by the bank for funding purposes equals just t.
The formal description of this condition is given in the proof of Proposition
1 which can be found in the Appendix.
But from this solution, it is immediate that an increase in uS typically leads
to a strictly lower use of collateral in the primary market, and to a strictly
higher use of collateral in the secondary market. Indeed, as Figure 1 il-
lustrates, if the rate in the primary market increases ceteris paribus, then
22In technical terms, this means that the measures induced by the balance sheet function
{(=) via the three mappings wS : S $ R+, wV : V $ R+,a n d(wS>w V):SV $ R2
+ have
densities that vanish nowhere.
17the most expensive type of collateral used in the primary market will not
be used for funding purposes anymore. Instead, secondary market funding
will increase by using the cheapest collateral that has not been used before-
hand. Moreover, collateral that implied similar premia in the primary and
secondary markets will be used in the secondary market. If there is a su!-
ciently broad range of collateral with heterogeneous cost structure, then an
increase in uS can only lead to a reduction of demand in the primary market.
Proposition 1. Assume that the bank’s balance sheet contains a su!ciently
broad range of collateral with a heterogeneous cost structure. Then the de-
mand function in the primary market will not react perfectly elastic to con-
ditions in the secondary market, i.e., marginal valuations of bidders in the
primary market will be strictly declining.
The proposition says that if collateral is su!ciently heterogeneous with re-
spect to the premia caused by it in transactions vis-à-vis either central bank
or market participants, then the demand function of an individual counter-
party in the primary market will react smoothly to changes in the secondary
market rate. Thus, the marginal valuation of an individual commercial bank
in open market operations may be strictly declining due to the necessity to
handle the ﬁnancial risks associated with the funding transaction, and due
to the fact that central bank and market participants have dierent needs
for managing these risks.23
Comparison with treasury auctions. In the example of governmen-
tal treasury auctions, the dierences in the premia between primary and
secondary markets are mainly driven by dierences in liquidity between on-
the-run and o-the-run securities (cf. Bikhchandani and Huang [8]). In the
model of dual funding, this would correspond to a situation with an essen-
tially degenerated measure on D. Just one type of transaction dW 5 SV is
23The reader will note that the conclusion of Proposition 1 does not depend on the
dierences of collateral requirements between primary and secondary markets. To see why,
assume that S = V = B. Then the argument goes through under the realistic assumption
that the transaction premia of individual transactions dier at least somewhat between
primary and secondary markets.
18feasible, with a liquidity premium wS(dW) in the primary market, and wV(dW)
in the secondary market. Demand in the primary auction should therefore
respond almost perfectly elastically at uS = uV + wV(dW)  wS(dW),w h i c hi s
tantamount to essentially constant marginal valuations for participants in
treasury auctions.
We return now to our discussion of central bank reﬁnancing operations. In
particular, we will assume strictly declining marginal valuations for the rest
of the paper.
III. Uniform pricing
An auctioneer puts up for sale a random quantity, the total allotment e T  0,
of a perfectly divisible good. There are l =1 >===>q bidders. The bidders
do not observe the total allotment prior to the submission of bids. Neither
does the auctioneer exploit his information about the incoming bid sched-
ules to aect the distribution of e T. There are two alternative interpretations
for uncertainty about the aggregate allotment. First, the central bank may
possess a superior knowledge of the liquidity conditions in the banking sys-
tem. Second, there may be a fraction of non-strategic bidders.24 In practice,
one might expect that both eects contribute to the uncertainty about the
residual supply perceived by the individual bidder.
We will focus on the case of linear equilibria and will therefore assume that
e T has full support on [0;T] for some TA0. To obtain a piecewise linear
equilibrium also under the discriminatory pricing rule, we will have to assume
that e T is uniformly distributed. Moreover, it will be assumed throughout
that marginal valuations are linearly decreasing from a maximum valuation
yA0 that is common to all bidders.25 Thus, bidder l’s marginal valuations
24E.g., in the bidding data for the Eurosystem, there is a clearly distinguishable subpop-
ulation of bidders who place their bids at surprisingly high rates. These bidders need not
be non-strategic in the literal sense, but may be severely credit constrained as described
in Section II.
25In the model of dual funding developed in Section II, the interest rate y corresponds to
the smallest value of the primary market rate uS at which its is optimal for the counterparty
to rely exclusively on secondary market funding.




for an exogenous parameter El A 0. By a symmetric set-up, we mean a
parameter constellation satisfying E1 = === = Eq. The interpretation is that
y is the interest rate in the unsecured market, and that the slope parameter
El reﬂects the structure of counterparty l’s pool of collateral.
The tender mechanism asks each bidder l to submit a bid schedule that
speciﬁes, for any price s  0, the amount {l(s)  0 that bidder l is willing to
buy at s. A schedule {l(=) is called admissible if {l(=) is non-increasing, left-
continuous, and if {l(s)=0for any su!ciently high s.L e t{(s)=
Pq
l=1 {l(s)
denote the total demand at price s,a n dSW(e T)={s  0|{(s)  e T} the set
of prices at which total demand can be satisﬁed with the quantity e T.I ti s
straightforward to check that SW(e T) is non-empty for any e T  0 and for any
vector of admissible bid schedules {{l(=)}l=1>===>q. We may therefore deﬁne
the stop-out price as the inﬁmum sW(e T)=i n fSW(e T) of such prices. Only
admissible bid schedules are accepted by the auctioneer.
Individual allotments are determined by satisfying all bids strictly above the
stop-out price, and by applying rationing at the margin, if necessary.26 For-
mally, if {(0)  e T, then all bids are satisﬁed, so that the allotment to bid l
amounts to tW
l(e T)={l(0).O t h e r w i s e ,d e ﬁne {
+
l (sW)=l i m s<sW>sAsW {l(s) as












{l(sW(e T))  {
+
l (sW(e T))
{(sW(e T))  {+(sW(e T))
{e T  {
+(s
W(e T))}
in state e T. Thus, when demand exceeds supply, the allotment is composed of
a complete allocation of the part of the bid schedule that lies above the stop-
out price, and a pro-rata allocation of any ﬂat segment of the bid schedule
26Our results remain valid without modiﬁcation for all alternative rationing rules with
the property that bids strictly above the stop-out price are fully satisﬁed. As pointed
out by Kremer and Nyborg [36], rules with this characteristic are used predominantly in
practice.
20that lies at the stop-out price. The tuple (sW>t W
1>===>tW
q) consisting of the stop-
out price and the individual allotments will be referred to as the outcome of
the tender.
In both tender formats, bidders are assumed to maximize expected proﬁts.
In the uniform-price tender, bidder l pays the stop-out price sW per marginal
unit, so that bidder l’s proﬁts from an outcome (sW>tW
1>===>tW









Figure 2 illustrates bidder l’s proﬁt under the uniform pricing rule as the
shaded area between marginal valuation and stop-out price. The crucial ele-
ment driving bidding behaviour in this type of auction is the residual supply,
i.e., the supply diminished by the allotments made to the other bidders at
a given price. In our model, supply is perfectly inelastic, while the stated
demand of the other bidders is downward sloping. Thus the residual sup-
ply, being the horizontal dierence between supply by the central bank and
demand by the other bidders, must be increasing in the price. Indeed, the
higher the price, the lower the aggregate demand of the other bidders, so
that the residual supply must be increasing.
The ﬁgure suggests that it is clearly dominated to demand a strictly posi-
tive quantity at a price sAy. Similarly, it will be intuitively clear that a
zero bid at any price s?y will be dominated. Therefore, given the linear
quadratic set-up, a natural candidate for an equilibrium strategy is to scale
the underlying true demand function gl(s)=El max{y s;0} by a constant
factor, so that the candidate equilibrium attains the form
{l(s)=E
x
l max{y  s;0},( 1 1 )
where Ex
l A 0 is a constant. In the context of a uniform-price auction, we
will refer to an equilibrium in which all bidders l =1 >===>q u s es o m es c h e d u l e
of the form (11) as a linear equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Assume q  3,a n dt h a tT is not too large. Then there
exists a linear equilibrium (11) in the tender with uniform pricing. In fact,
21the equilibrium is unique within the class of linear equilibria. When compared
t ot h eu n d e r l y i n gt r u ed e m a n d ,b i d sa r es h a d e d ,i . e . ,Ex
l ?E l for all l.
Moreover, in any equilibrium with heterogeneous bidders, shading of bids is
monotonic, i.e., for all l 6= m we have Ex
l ?E x
m if and only if El ?E m.I n
the symmetric set-up, the equilibrium is given by Ex
l @El =( q  2)@(q  1)
for all l.
The proof as well as the full characterization of the equilibrium strategies
can be found in the Appendix. There, we follow the approach used by Kyle
[38], Klemperer and Meyer [35], and Back and Zender [2], which relies on the
intuition that if the quantity to be transacted is uncertain for the bidders,
then the optimal bidding strategy for the uniform pricing rule can essentially
be found by a state-by-state optimisation against the ex-post residual supply
curve.
The prediction of the model is consistent with general studies of bidding be-
haviour in uniform-price auctions such as Ausubel and Cramton [1]. Specif-
ically, the main prediction is dierential bid shading, i.e., that bidders will
state their demand sincerely only for the initial marginal unit, and shade
their bids at all strictly positive quantities. Indeed, intuitively, the bidder
has an incentive to shade demand because the stop-out price will apply not
only to the marginal unit, but to the whole allotment to bidder l.
The conditions imposed in Proposition 2 appear necessary to obtain the re-
sult. In particular, there is no linear equilibrium with strictly decreasing bid
schedules for just two bidders. Indeed, it is straightforward to check that,
in this case, the slope of the residual supply for the individual bidders is
too steep to allow convergence of the dynamics of mutual best responses.
Similarly, the requirement on T ensures that the tender price does not fall
to zero in equilibrium with strictly positive probability. If this condition is
violated with strictly positive probability, then the established equilibrium
breaks down in the present model. Intuitively, if the stop-out price is zero
with strictly positive probability, then bidders would like to overstate de-
mand at price zero in anticipation of the rationing. With continuous prices,
22however, this cannot be an optimal strategy. In the proof, we allow for the
possibility that the stop-out price drops to zero as the result of a deviation
from equilibrium behaviour.
Proposition 3. Consider a family of tenders {W(q)}q=3>4>5>=== with uniform
pricing, in which a random quantity not larger than T(q)=qT is auc-
tioned o to q bidders. Assume that the slope parameters {El(q)}l=1>===>q are
uniformly bounded, i.e., there are EAEA 0 such that E  El(q)  E
for all q  3 and for all l =1 >===>q. Assume also that T?E y.T h e n
limq<" Ex
l (q)@El(q)=1for all l.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Proposition 3 extends a special
case of Klemperer and Meyer’s Proposition 8a (linear demand with p =0 )
by allowing for bidder heterogeneity. It also suggests the robustness of a
very general result by Swinkels [51] for auctions of a ﬁnite number of identi-
cal units. Intuitively, Proposition 3 says that bid shading disappears under
the uniform pricing rule in large populations of bidders provided that rela-
tive marginal valuations do not vary too widely. The reason is that, when
the number of bidders increases and each new bidder adds non-negligible
demand, then the residual supply curve faced by an individual bidder be-
comes ﬂatter and ﬂatter in the (t>s) diagram. As a consequence, the eect
that an individual bidder will have on the price realised in the tender will be
smaller and smaller, leading to a higher quantity submitted at a given price.
In the limit, the residual supply is essentially a horizontal line, and induces
price-taking behaviour on the part of the individual bidder. Thus, under the
uniform pricing rule, bid shading vanishes in the limit population.
IV. Discriminatory pricing
Bid schedules can be formally described in two natural ways, one expressing
demand at given prices (the one used so far), and the other attaching prices
to given quantities. The discriminatory pricing rule requires the payment
of the individual bidder’s own price bid on the allotted quantities. It is
therefore natural to work, rather than with the bid schedule {l(s) itself, with
23the inverse schedule el(tl)=i n f {s  0|{l(s)  tl}.T h e ﬁgure el(tl) can
be understood as the stated willingness to pay (the “bid”) for the marginal
unit at quantity tl, contrasting the true willingness to pay for the marginal
unit (the “valuation”), which is given by yl(tl). Similarly as in the deﬁnition
of the stop-out price, one can check that el(tl) is well-deﬁned for admissible
bid schedules {l(=).M o r e o v e r ,el(tl) is a non-increasing and right-continuous
function.
Under discriminatory pricing, the bidder l pays his own bid el(tl) for any










{yl(tl)  el(tl)}gtl.( 1 2 )
The shaded area in Figure 3 depicts bidder l’s proﬁt under the discrimina-
tory pricing rule. Thus, in contrast to the case of the uniform-price auction,
the whole bid schedule above the realized stop-out price sW determines the
bidder’s proﬁt, not just the quantity placed at sW. This feature of the dis-
criminatory pricing rule makes the general characterisation of the equilibrium
more involved so that we have to restrict ourselves to the symmetric set-up.27
Proposition 4. Assume q  2, and that bidders l =1 >===>q have identical
marginal valuations yl(tl)=y  E31tl. Assume also that T?q yE. Then
there exists an equilibrium in the tender with discriminatory pricing in which
bidder l submits the piecewise linear bid schedule
{l(s)=
;
A A A A ?
A A A A =
0 for sAyg
Eg(yg  s) for smin ?s yg
E(y  s) for s  smin
(13)
27In the asymmetric case, marginal conditions do not describe an equilibrium, which
illustrates a potential problem with the ﬁrst-order approach to the analysis of multi-
unit auctions. Indeed, one can show that an equilibrium in pure strategies does not
exist in the asymmetric case. The reason is that ﬁrst-order conditions for an equilibrium
imply crossovers and ﬂat sections on bid schedules, which in turn make non-marginal
deviations attractive. The impossibility of an equilibrium in a related bidding game with
an asymmetric population of bidders has been shown by Menezes and Monteiro [45].
24for l =1 >===>q,w h e r e
y









smin = y 
T
qE
,( 1 6 )
are the maximum price bid, the slope of the inverse bid schedule, and the
minimum stop-out price, respectively.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Figure 3 illustrates the bidding
behaviour in the discriminatory auction. The intersection point between
the individual bid schedule and the residual supply would determine both
the allotment to the counterparty and the marginal rate in the operation.
Moving from this intersection point upwards until the marginal valuation
is found would deliver an interest rate level that should correspond to the
marginal interbank repo rate uV+wV(d). This marginal interbank repo rate is
associated with the asset type d for which a counterparty would be indierent
between using it either in the primary or in the secondary market, or not at
all for funding purposes (cf. Section II).
Compared to the uniform-pricing rule, the shading is of a dierent nature. In
a uniform tender, the slope of the strategic bid schedule is steeper than the
true demand. This is because in a uniform-price auction, each bidder pays the
stop-out price for the whole allotment. As the stop-out price is determined
on the basis of the relevant part of his bid schedule, shading of bids should
be expected for any strictly positive quantity. Moreover, the shading of bids
should become more pronounced for larger quantities because the relative
beneﬁt from shading the bid schedule increases for larger quantities.
In an auction with discriminatory pricing, however, the strategic bid curve
is ﬂatter than the true demand. There is little shading of bids at larger
quantities, and more shading at smaller quantities. As a consequence, with
discriminatory pricing, there is shading in the intercept of the demand func-
tion. The reason for this die r e n tf o r mo fb i ds h a d i n gi st h a tt h ep r i c eb i d
25placed at a given quantity will appear to be too high from an ex-post per-
spective only if the allotment was large enough. The placement of an honest
price bid at low quantities is therefore more likely to lead to a decrease in
expected proﬁts than the placement of an honest price bid at high quantities.
This leads to a more pronounced shading of bids for small quantities.
Proposition 4 makes also clear predictions about the shape of the bid sched-
ules if q is large. Speciﬁcally, assume that as q goes to inﬁnity, the quantity
allotted is T(q)=qT. Then the above result predicts that the maximum






.( 1 7 )
Thus, strategic behaviour does not disappear in the limit.28 As we will
explain now, this may be an explanation for an unexpected empirical obser-
vation that has been made for euro area.
Evidence of bid shading. Since June 2000, the Eurosystem has chosen to
conduct its regular main reﬁnancing operations in the form of variable rate
tenders with discriminatory pricing. Our model of equilibrium bidding in
variable rate tenders, even though it is somewhat stylised, can be interpreted
in a way that corresponds to the realities of these operations.
Indeed, the formal model predicts that even in a large auction, the marginal
rate in the tender lies strictly below the marginal interbank repo rate, as a
consequence of bid shading.29 This prediction is in line with the data for
the euro area. To see why this is the case, recall that the general collateral
28Given that the uncertainty about aggregate supply does not disappear in the limit,
this ﬁnding is consistent with existing theoretical results for large auctions obtained by
Swinkels [51]. See also Swinkels [50].
29The marginal rate is the lowest rate at which bids are allotted, and corresponds intu-
itively to the marginal cost of funding in the primary market. Expectations about this rate
determine the optimal split of funding between primary and secondary markets. The mar-
ginal rate diers from the so-called weighted average rate, which is the volume-weighted
average of the interest rates of all winning bids, and which would intuitively correspond
to the average cost of funding in the primary market. In the discriminatory auction, the
weighted average rate lies always weakly above the marginal rate.
26is a collection of higher-rated securities that serve as a standard in inter-
bank lending. The criteria for general collateral are comparably strict. In
fact, they are stricter than the eligibility criteria that are applied by the Eu-
rosystem for collateral used in open market operations. As mentioned before,
counterparties tend to use the less expensive illiquid collateral in central bank
operations. The natural benchmark for the marginal rate in the central bank
operation is therefore not the GC repo rate but the (higher) rate required
for a repurchase agreement in the market against the illiquid collateral.
As a consequence, the GC repo rate should be on average lower than the
hypothetical rate at which the market would price repurchase agreements
based on marginal asset types used as collateral in the reﬁnancing opera-
tions of the Eurosystem. However, surprisingly at ﬁrst sight, one cannot
reject the null hypothesis of the equality between the market repo rate and
the marginal rate in the main reﬁnancing operations of the Eurosystem (cf.
Cassola, Ravazzolo, and Würtz [14]). The analysis therefore suggests strate-
gic bid shading as a possible explanation for the marginal rate in the auction
being lower than predicted by arbitrage considerations.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed some aspects of the economics of mone-
tary reﬁnancing operations. We have argued that the auctioning of central
bank reserves diers from the auctioning of other divisible goods such as
treasury securities. Reﬁnancing operations are special because they involve
the management of the ﬁnancial risks associated with the reﬁnancing trans-
action. E.g., in the case of the regular reﬁnancing operations conducted by
the Eurosystem, counterparties have some discretion concerning the choice
of eligible collateral. The individual bidder will therefore exploit comparably
cheap (i.e., illiquid) collateral ﬁrst in central bank operations. As the private
market requires a premium on illiquid assets, this suggests declining marginal
valuations for interbank liquidity. This point is crucial because marginal val-
uations are the main determinant of optimal bidding behaviour in central
bank operations.
27To evaluate incentives for bidding in central bank operations under this as-
sumption, we have considered a model in the tradition of Klemperer and
Meyer [35], assuming linearly decreasing marginal valuations and uncertain
supply. Our contribution here is the explicit construction of an equilibrium in
the discriminatory auction. The construction provides an explicitly solvable
model with declining marginal valuations.30
The analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour supports the view that coun-
terparties have an incentive to adjust their bid schedules strategically in
response to the uncertainty about the stop-out rate. The adjustments lead
throughout to lowered demand, i.e., to bid shading. For instance, under the
uniform pricing rule, the bidder has an incentive to understate her quantity
demanded especially at relatively low interest rates, because this will on av-
erage lower the stop-out rate applied on all her winning bids. Therefore, in
the case of the uniform pricing rule, counterparties should be expected to
submit bid schedules that are steeper than the underlying demand.
These ﬁndings have served as a reference point for our analysis of the more
relevant discriminatory pricing rule, applied by the Eurosystem in its main
reﬁnancing operations since June 2000. Here, the model unambiguously pre-
dicts that optimal bid schedules in the discriminatory auction will be ﬂatter
than the underlying demand. This is intuitive, because under the discrimi-
natory pricing rule, a winning bidder not only has an obvious incentive for
reducing demand at all interest rates, but also for a more pronounced bid
shading at higher and less likely interest rates. This would suggest the opti-
mal submission of bid schedules that a concentrated on relatively few interest
rates.
Our theory also predicts that the extent of bid shading under the discrim-
inatory pricing rule does not disappear in large auctions. This suggests an
explanation of the fact that the spread between the marginal rate in the main
reﬁnancing operations of the Eurosystem and the general collateral repo rate
30For an empirical test of the model, see Cassola, Ewerhart, and Morana [13].
28in the euro money market is statistically zero, despite the broader range of
collateral eligible for the Eurosystem when compared to the repo market.
The point to note here is that the Eurosystem accepts also collateral that
is less liquid than general collateral (GC), which leads to a dierence in
the composition of collateral between primary and secondary markets. In
the absence of strategic bidding, funding costs should therefore depend on
whether liquidity is obtained from the central bank or in the secured segment
of the euro money market. The dierence should amount to a few basis
points. However, there is only a statistically insigniﬁcant dierence between
the GC repo rate and the marginal rate obtained in the weekly open market
operations. Our analysis of optimal bidding behaviour in the context of a
secondary market provides a natural explanation of this observation.31
Appendix. Proofs.




W A 0, as depicted in Figure 1. The volume of funding in the





















W) is the subset of VS characterised by (9). We wish to show
that tS is decreasing continuously in uS. Assume therefore that uS increases
marginally, ceteris paribus. In Figure 1, the solid diagonal would shift slightly
to the left. To show that tS decreases, assume to the contrary that tS
31As pointed out by many writers, it would be very desirable to have a full-ﬂedged
model of the discriminatory auction incorporating heterogeneity of bidders, incomplete
information, and non-linear valuations. This might allow to explain further interesting
empirical observations as reported, e.g., in ECB [19], Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev
[10], Breitung and Nautz [11], Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil [41], and Bruno, Ordine, and
Scalia [12]. In Ewerhart, Cassola, and Valla [29], we develop such a model for the case of
the ﬁxed rate tender.




W), the critical value wS
W either stays constant or increases. In
particular, it follows from (8) that wV
W increases strictly. But then, because



















and the set V1(wS
W >w V
W) characterised by (10), increases strictly. However, be-
cause (2) must be satisﬁed with equality in the cost-minimizing case, we have
tS + tV = t.A stS and tV cannot both increase, we obtain a contradiction.
Therefore tS must decrease. It is now obvious from the implicit function
theorem that tS cannot jump when the bank’s balance sheet is su!ciently
heterogeneous. This proves Proposition 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Keep l ﬁxed, and assume that bidders m 6= l
use a bid schedule {m(s)=Ex
m max{y  s;0} for some Ex




m . Assume that bidder l uses an admissible bid schedule {l(s),a n d
consider state e T.I tw i l lb es h o w nﬁrst that any price-quantity combination
(s;tl)=( sW(e T);tW
l(e T)) resulting from ({l(=)>{ 3l(=)) in state e T under the
uniform pricing rule satisﬁes precisely one of the following three conditions:
(i) sAy and tl = e T
(ii) 0 ?s y and tl = e T  (y  s)Ex
3l  0
(iii) s =0and 0  tl  e T  yEx
3l
Clearly, if {(0)  e T,t h e nsW(e T)=0and condition (iii) is satisﬁed. Assume







W(e T)) + e T  {
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W(e T))












This implies that either (i), (ii), or (iii) will be satisﬁe d . T h i sp r o v e st h e

































}.( 2 0 )
Selecting a point (s>tl) satisfying (i) obviously cannot yield a strictly positive
proﬁt. Moreover, from (19) it follows that among the points (s>tl) satisfying
condition (iii), the proﬁt-maximising alternative would entail a quantity tW
l =
e T  yEx
3l. We are therefore essentially reduced to case (ii), where tW
l +( y 
sW)Ex
3l = e T.I m p l i c i t d i erentiation delivers CtW
l@CsW = Ex
3l. Using this in
the ﬁrst-order condition resulting from (20) yields the assertion. Now, we
















where the parameter Ex





















l . Using this notation, condition (18) can be rewritten




















31However, only the negative root is economically relevant because otherwise
Ex
l AE l, which would contradict (18). This delivers (21). Summing up over
all l =1 >===>q, and rearranging yields (22). To see why (22) has a unique
strictly positive root, note that the equation is certainly satisﬁed for Ex
W =0 .
The left-hand side of (22) has a strictly positive ﬁrst derivative in Ex
W =0 ,
and is strictly concave for all Ex
W  0, so there is at most one root Ex
W A 0.
Using (21), this proves uniqueness. On the other hand, for Ex
W $4 ,t h e

























which eventually becomes negative for a su!ciently large Ex
W.I n v o k i n g
the intermediate value theorem proves existence, and thereby the assertion.
Clearly, we have Ex
l ?E l. Moreover, the right-hand side of (21) is strictly
increasing in El, which proves the monotonicityp r o p e r t yo fe q u i l i b r i u mb i d s
in heterogeneous populations of bidders. The assertion concerning the sym-
metric case is immediate from (21) and (22). ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix q. Without loss of generality, E1(q) 
El(q) for all l =1 >===>q. From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that
the slope parameters Ex
1(q)>===>Ex
q(q) are characterised uniquely by (18).
Monotonicity implies Ex
1(q)  Ex
l (q) for all l =1 >===>q.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,o n e
has Ex
3l(q)  (q  1)Ex
















3l(q)  (q  1)E
x
1(q)  (q  2)E1(q)  (q  2)E.






























32so that Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of the linear equilibrium. Con-
sidering the limit for q $4yields the assertion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. Keep an individual bidder l ﬁxed. Denote bidder
l’s bid schedule by {l(s), and the resulting inverse bid schedule by el(tl).
Assume that bidders m 6= l use the bid schedule given by (13). We will show
now that the optimal response of bidder l is of the same form. Expected









l ( h T)
0
(yl(tl)  el(tl))gtlge T.










(yl(tl)  el(tl))ge Tgtl,( 2 3 )
where T(tl)={e T 5 [0;T]|tW
l(e T)  tl} is the set of total allotments such






pr{T(tl)}(yl(tl)  el(tl))gtl,( 2 4 )
where pr{T(tl)} denotes the probability that bidder l receives an allotment
of at least tl. Given that the bid schedules of bidders m 6= l are continuous,
it is a straightforward exercise to check that
pr{T(tl)} = pr{t
W





A A A A ?
A A A A =
T  tl if el(tl) A yg
T  tl  (q  1)(yg  el(tl))Eg if smin  el(tl)  yg
T  tl  (q  1)(y  el(tl))E if el(tl) ?s min
for tl 5 [0;T@q]. The explicit calculation is helpful as it shows that pr{T(tl)}
does not depend on the whole bid schedule, but only on el(tl). We will search
now ﬁrst for a pointwise maximiser eW
l(tl) of the integrand
L(el>t l)=pr{T(tl)}(yl(tl)  el)
33in (24), and check then that the thereby obtained inverse bid schedule eW
l(tl)
results from the conjectured bid schedule {l(s).L e ttl  0 be given. Clearly,
we have eW
l(tl)  yg for tl ? T because otherwise, lowering eW
l(tl) marginally
would increase the integrand. We maximise the integrand now assuming the
second case in (25), ignoring the restrictions for the moment. This yields
e
W
l(tl)=a r gm a x
el









2(q  1)Eg.( 2 6 )
Evaluating this expression at tl =0delivers (14), and plugging the obtained
value for yg back into (26) leads to (15). It is suboptimal to choose the
boundary value el(tl)=yg.T os e ew h yt h i si st r u e ,o n ec o m p a r e st h ev a l u e
of the integrand at the boundary, i.e.,
L(y
g>t l)=
{T  (2q  1)tl}(T  tl)
TE(2q  1)







It is straightforward to check that the interior solution eW
l(tl) is always pre-
ferred to yg.A d e v i a t i o n t o ab i del(tl) ?s min is also not optimal. To see
why, note that from (25), in this case
L(el>t l)={T  tl  (q  1)(y  el)E}(yl(tl)  el).












But for tl  T@q, a straightforward calculation shows that e
#
l (tl)  smin.
As L(el>t l) is concave in el, the optimum bid must satisfy eW
l(tl)  smin.
Therefore, lowering eW
l(tl) below smin cannot improve bidder l’s payo at









34provided that T?q yE. The bidder is indierent about the bid schedule
for quantities tl A T@q,s ow em a ys e teW
l(tl)=y  E31tl for these values.
We have found a pointwise maximiser of (24). Clearly, this function eW
l(tl)
results from the bid schedule given in (13). ¤
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